The main argument in this article is that the Reconstruction historiography started being revolutionized during the early 1930s, but the courts and the legal profession remained slow in embracing this revolution. The author argues that during the early twentieth century, historians viewed federal intervention to protect freed slaves’ civil rights as a mistake. Moreover, many Supreme Court decisions that were made during this time were founded on narrow interpretations of various constitutional amendments relating to freed slaves’ civil rights. Similarly, Foner argues that the Supreme Court played a vital role in creating a situation where the ideals of Reconstruction were not pursued any further (1589). Meanwhile, he contends that it is unfair to blame jurists for the neglect of Reconstruction simply because they were being influenced by the dominant views of the day (Foner, 1589). The situation was significantly attributed to the return of racism and discrimination against African Americans.
To begin with, Foner reports that since the early 1930s, latter-day historians have rejected the works of Reconstruction historians due to their racist, unbalanced, and incomplete nature (1585). The correct position according to these historians is the Republicans who worked hard to protect the civil rights of freed slaves should be commended. Additionally, this article argues that Supreme Court Jurisprudence is significantly influenced by a Reconstruction narrative that has already been repudiated by historians. This is because the court is unwilling to overturn the flawed precedents of the Reconstruction era. In the author’s view, these precedents are a major hindrance to the fulfillment of the principle of equality before the law in America. Therefore, Foner recommends that the Supreme Court should reject all precedents that are based on a faulty interpretation of historical developments during Reconstruction in order for the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to be rectified (1585).
Accordingly, this argument is significant given the numerous examples that the author provides and its relevance in helping historians understand the origin of the Supreme Court jurisprudence. In one example, Foner reports that governments across the English-speaking world copied each other’s racial views, which revolved around the idea a multiracial government was not tenable (1589). Meanwhile, a lot of focus is on how the Supreme Court hindered the achievement of racial equality by adopting legal interpretations that reflected the most dominant public views.
Similarly, the Supreme Court rulings reflected the views of historians, who argued that Reconstruction-era abuses were triggered by the decision to give voting right to black men in disregard of their inability to exercise it. The resulting intellectual environment shaped the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the laws that were enacted with a view to promote racial equality. This view continued to prevail even during the early twentieth century, and the Supreme Court went ahead to adopt a white-supremacist version of racial equality. Nevertheless, there was a state of ambivalence regarding the level of racial equality that was considered acceptable. However, the Supreme Court always chose a narrow interpretation whenever it was faced with such a challenge. Although ideas were evolving, the Supreme Court chose to remain fixated with a narrow interpretation. For example, it stuck to the so-called “story of the times” when interpreting the meaning of the fourteenth Amendment.
With this in mind, the author’s argument means a lot today because it helps explain why today’s Supreme Court jurisprudence remains anchored on a faulty view of the Reconstruction narrative. It sheds light on the dissatisfaction that resulted from the Reconstruction Supreme Case decisions that constitute today’s jurisprudence on race relations. Just like in the present situation, the narrow interpretations of the Supreme Court during Reconstruction triggered protests from those who had voted to enact the laws. In some cases, courts were citing works of history instead of previous cases, and this explains why Supreme Court deliberations were significantly affected by the historiography of the Reconstruction era. The jurists of the day were influenced by inaccurate historiography in their legal interpretations, and this explains why many laws existed in books but were never enforced in the real world.
Consequently, the Supreme Court continues to struggle with this jurisprudence even today. An in-depth analysis of this article provides a better understanding of the origin of this struggle and how things could have turned out differently had the Court adopted a broader view. The argument helps modern historians understand why in some cases judges were on record for claiming that blacks were primitive in nature. Foner explains that many judges in the South seemed to prefer “home rule” that embraced domination by whites; they hated to see Northerners introduce new ideals that would promote more rights to freed slaves (1595).
Finally, this article provides a wealth of information that enables historians to understand the circumstances under which latter-day Supreme Courts have sometimes failed to appreciate that previous Supreme Courts relied on inaccurate historiographies to make rulings and interpret laws governing racial relations in the American public life. This makes the article is a valuable reference because it does not misrepresent the past; rather it sheds light on how jurists of the late nineteenth century interpreted laws based on prevailing racial attitudes and how these interpretations continue to have a negative impact on today’s Supreme Court decisions on racial relations.
Works Cited
Foner, Eric. “The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—and Vice-Versa.” Columbia Law Review, 112.7 (2012): 1585-1606.